Market-based agents refer to reinforcement learning agents which determine their actions based on an internal market of sub-agents. We introduce a new type of market-based algorithm where the state itself is factored into several axes called ``goods'', which allows for greater specialization and parallelism than existing market-based RL algorithms. Furthermore, we argue that market-based algorithms have the potential to address many current challenges in AI, such as search, dynamic scaling and complete feedback, and demonstrate that they may be seen to generalize neural networks; finally, we list some novel ways that market algorithms may be applied in conjunction with Large Language Models for immediate practical applicability.

Pearl opened the door to formally defining actual causation using causal models. His approach rests on two strategies: first, capturing the widespread intuition that X=x causes Y=y iff X=x is a Necessary Element of a Sufficient Set for Y=y, and second, showing that his definition gives intuitive answers on a wide set of problem cases. This inspired dozens of variations of his definition of actual causation, the most prominent of which are due to Halpern & Pearl. Yet all of them ignore Pearl's first strategy, and the second strategy taken by itself is unable to deliver a consensus. This paper offers a way out by going back to the first strategy: it offers six formal definitions of causal sufficiency and two interpretations of necessity. Combining the two gives twelve new definitions of actual causation. Several interesting results about these definitions and their relation to the various Halpern & Pearl definitions are presented. Afterwards the second strategy is evaluated as well. In order to maximize neutrality, the paper relies mostly on the examples and intuitions of Halpern & Pearl. One definition comes out as being superior to all others, and is therefore suggested as a new definition of actual causation.